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1. Introduction
Although disaster-related displacement is not new, it
is undoubtable that climate change and the associated
increased incidence of extreme weather events amplify
the risk (Adger et al., 2014, pp. 758, 768). Yet the multi-
faceted nature of mobility makes it an almost impossible
phenomenon to forecast with any precision. Specific dis-
placement impacts of climate change are equally unpre-
dictable because the effects of climate change are not
linear and will rarely be the single influencing factor
(Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer,&Hsiang, 2014;McLeman,
2018). Still, there is high scientific agreement that cli-
mate change impacts will contribute to contemporary
human mobility into the future (Pörtner et al., 2019,
p. 396). A recent study has predicted that absent cli-
mate mitigation or migration, between one billion and
three billion people will reside outside the “tempera-
ture niche” favourable to human life by 2070 (Xu, Kohler,
Lenton, Svenning, & Scheffer, 2020). We are already wit-
nessing these effects. Of the 33.4million people internal-
ly displaced in 2019, 24,9 million were displaced by dis-
aster (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020a,
p. 9). Because internal displacement is often the pre-
cursor for cross-border displacement, a comprehensive
approach to disaster displacement ought to consider
both (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020b,
p. 5; Nansen Initiative, 2015, pp. 8, 32–41).
This article examines the international legal pro-
tections available to people displaced by disaster in
the context of recent and notable legal developments.
A groundswell of international instruments over the
past decade have incorporated express recognition of
the nexus between disaster and displacement into their
terms. Moreover, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Committee’s January 2020 decision on non-refoulement
obligations, the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration (hereafter Migration Compact),
and evolving interpretations of the right to life, have
advanced contemporary legal thinking on the legal pro-
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tections owed. The article first clarifies its scope and pro-
vides a primer on the legal landscape, followed by a short
section explaining the limited relevance of refugee law.
It then addresses recent legal developments, including
the UN Human Rights Committee’s January 2020 deci-
sion on non-refoulement obligations, and the increased
legal recognition of the nexus between disaster pre-
paredness and human rights protection. The penulti-
mate section examines how the increased frequency and
intensity of extreme weather events can further dimin-
ish state capacity to honour its international legal obliga-
tions, before final conclusions are drawn.
The word ‘disaster’ attracts various interpreta-
tions in international law. The 2016 International Law
Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the Protection of
Persons in the Event of Disaster, for example, defines dis-
aster in line with the idea that a disaster is an event that
causes harm of a gravity to constitute a serious disrup-
tion to the functioning of society (ILC, 2016, Art. 3(a)).
The ILC acknowledged that its approach went against
contemporary thinking about disaster but was of the
view that the more modern conceptualisation, which
perceives disaster as the consequence of the event,
would be too broad to be legally meaningful (ILC, 2016,
commentary on Art. 3(a), para. 3). Yet earlier interna-
tional instruments interpreted disaster in line with the
modern construction, (see for example the Tampere
Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication
Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations,
1998, Art. 1(6); hereafter Tampere Convention). The con-
temporary approach responds to the long-held concern
that to define disaster as an event fails to consider the
socio-economic, political and other societal conditions
that contribute to individual or household vulnerability
(see, for example, Cannon, 1994).
This article adopts the interpretation adopted by the
UN General Assembly’s intergovernmental expert work-
ing group on indicators and terminology relating to disas-
ter risk reduction. It defined disaster as:
A serious disruption of the functioning of a communi-
ty or a society at any scale due to hazardous events
interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability
and capacity, leading to one or more of the following:
human, material, economic and environmental losses
and impacts. (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 13)
The proviso that the disaster must “exceed the capaci-
ty of the community or society to cope using its own
resources” has been used elsewhere with reference to
cross-border displacement (Nansen Initiative, 2015), but
would narrow the construction too far for present pur-
poses. Amore expansive conceptualisation allows discus-
sion of the law governing both internal displacement as
well as cross-border movement. It also permits consid-
eration of the broad swathe of climate change-related
displacement-causing events, whether sudden onset or
slow onset in character. That is not to say that this defini-
tion is to be preferred generally, the parameters of which
will inevitably depend upon the context in which it is
used and the character and purpose of the relevant law.
There is no single international instrument that pro-
vides a legal basis for the protection of individuals who
are displaced by disaster. Despite some calls for an inter-
national agreement (Docherty & Giannini, 2009; Prieur,
2018) there does not appear to be much contempo-
rary appetite for one, even within the legal community
(Mayer, 2011, 2013; McAdam, 2011; Nishimura, 2015).
This is in part due to the absence of any clear and agreed
definitions of who would fall within the relevant protect-
ed category (be it ‘disaster migrant,’ ‘climate refugee’ or
something else) and the problems associated with creat-
ing such boundaries (Apap, 2019;Mayer, 2018). In partic-
ular there is a tension between ensuring a definition that
is sufficiently confined as to be legally meaningful, and at
the same time accounting for the “complex causality of
climate migration and the heterogeneity of the phenom-
ena it encompasses” (Mayer, 2013, p. 98).
One could argue that this article’s preoccupa-
tion with law is misplaced insofar as internation-
al policy processes have advanced normative gap-
filling and cultivated effective practices for the pro-
tection of people displaced by disaster. The state-led
Nansen Initiative (2012–2015), for instance, developed
a detailed approach to cross-border disaster displace-
ment, which incorporated best practice, and identified
normative gaps. The resultant Agenda for the Protection
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of
Disasters and Climate Change (hereafter Protection
Agenda) was endorsed by 109 states and provided
the architecture for the work of its successor process,
the Platform on Disaster Displacement (see further,
McAdam, 2016). Another example, the Taskforce on
Displacement, is a small group of experts tasked with
guiding the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss
and Damage Associatedwith Climate Change to enhance
“cooperation and facilitation in relation to human mobil-
ity, including migration, displacement and planned relo-
cation” (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
[UNFCCC], 2015, para. 49; UNFCCC, n.d., para. 5). It is
important to recall that the relationship of such process-
es to international law is complementary, not dichoto-
mous. Law is typically informed by, and often lags behind,
policy developments. In that sense, these processes will
likely feed into any future legal agreements. Moreover,
legal norms, particularly those in human rights, have pro-
vided the baseline from which policy recommendations
have grown.
Indeed, it is no longer completely correct to remark
that “in the absence of commonly agreed standards,
the disaster victim is at the mercy of the vagaries of
the humanitarian response, political calculation, indiffer-
ence or ignorance” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 145). The past
20 years have seen the international approach to dis-
aster shift from one which occurred within the context
of legal exceptionalism—treating disaster as an anoma-
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lous condition during which exceptions to international
law apply—towards one grounded in existing and emerg-
ing legal frameworks (Lauta, 2015, p. 75). The poten-
tial of international law to advance the response to and
avoidance of disaster is evidenced by the various inter-
national legal agreements and instruments that have
been concluded on the topic. Traditionally, many of
these have taken a top-down logistical approach, with-
out necessarily affording specific protection to individ-
uals, notwithstanding that compliance with their terms
would likely preserve human life. Examples of such
agreements include the Hyogo Framework for Action
2005–2015 and its successor the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (hereafter Sendai
Framework) which focus on disaster management and
disaster risk management, as well as binding treaties
withmore specific focus such as the Tampere Convention
mentioned above.
Another category of international agreement is those
that concern the protection of individuals, or a catego-
ry of individuals, and have incorporated consideration
of disasters into one or more of their provisions in ways
that might be relevant for displaced individuals who fall
within their terms. Article 11 of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), for instance,
provides that parties shall take all necessarymeasures to
ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabili-
ties in situations of risk, including “humanitarian emer-
gencies and natural disasters.” The Declaration on the
Rights of Peasants, adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 2018, provides that states “shall take appropriatemea-
sures to strengthen the resilience of peasants and oth-
er people working in rural areas against natural disasters
and other severe disruptions” (Declaration on the Rights
of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas,
2018, Art. 16(5)). Of particular relevance, the Migration
Compact contains several paragraphs that address meth-
ods to mitigate disaster-related displacement, which are
considered later in this article (Migration Compact, 2018,
para. 18).
These categorisations are neither perfect nor exhaus-
tive. The point for now is simply to illustrate that while
international law governing disaster preparedness and
response has grown, for better or worse no internation-
al instrument contains as its focus legal protections for
people displaced by disaster. Instead, their protection
is derived from a patchwork of new and existing legal
instruments, usually not specific to disaster but simply
applied in the context of one. This article explains the
scope and limitations of that law, beginning with refugee
protection and the principle of non-refoulement under
human rights law.
2. Refugee Law and Disaster Displacement
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951;
hereafter Refugee Convention) offers the strongest pro-
tection under international law for people who cross an
international border seeking protection. This is because,
among other things, of the Refugee Convention’s wide
ratification, its long history, and that it ensures a series
of specific protections such as the right to employ-
ment, public education and social security (see Refugee
Convention, 1951, Chapters III–IV). Yet, in contrast to
the popularity of the term ‘climate refugee’ (addressed
further below), the Refugee Convention will very rarely
offer individual protection for people displaced by dis-
aster (see, e.g., McAdam, 2012; Nishimura, 2015; Philip,
2018). A refugee is a person who is outside the country
of his nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of
persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country (Refugee Convention, 1951, Art. 1A). Any claim
for refugee status on the grounds of the disaster event
alone will prima facie fail: It is not persecution, and flee-
ing disaster does not qualify a person for refugee status
under the Refugee Convention (AH (Sudan) v. Secretary
of State, 2007;Applicant A v.Minister of Immigration and
Multiethnic Affairs, 1998; McAdam, 2012, pp. 42–48).
However where a state’s response to disaster fails to
meet the needs of marginalized groups, that situation
could give rise to persecution within a Convention mean-
ing and open to the door to refugee status (AF (Kiribati),
2013, para. 58; McAdam, 2012). So too could refugee
status become an active question in the context of a
nexus between climate change and armed conflict, or
under the broader definition of ‘refugee’ under the two
main regional refugee agreements, in which the term
is extended to include people fleeing events or circum-
stances “seriously disturbing public order” (Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees, 1984, para. 3; Convention
Governing Certain Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
1969, Art. 1(2); Weerasinghe, 2018).
These are legally arguable exceptions to the gener-
al rule that people moving for disaster-related reasons
will not meet the criteria for refugee status. However,
they are rarely argued and have not so far given rise to
refugee status having been granted. Thus, although a dis-
aster would seem to be a prima facie case of an event
seriously disturbing public order, no states have express-
ly recognised this as triggering their refugee obligations
under the regional definitions. Instead, states have tend-
ed to enact temporary protection under domestic law
(Weerasinghe, 2018).
The limited scope of refugee law leaves behind a
widely recognised ‘protection gap,’ including for peo-
ple displaced by disaster (Behrman & Kent, 2018;
Kolmannskog & Trebbi, 2010; Kuusipalo, 2016; Philip,
2018). So why does the phrase ‘climate refugee’ contin-
ue to feature prominently in public discourse when it
is widely accepted that refugee status will rarely apply?
There is not scope to answer this question comprehen-
sively here, but it would be remiss not to offer a few
brief points on terminology given the prevalence of the
phrase. First, the use of the word ‘climate’ preceding
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the word ‘refugee’ narrows the focus to a particular
kind of disaster. Disaster is, of course, not exclusively
weather or climate related, as centuries of armed conflict
and the current Covid-19 pandemic evince. Nevertheless,
outside war—which has its own comprehensive legal
regime—weather (and therefore also climate) accounts
for the bulk of people displaced by disaster (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020a).
As outlined above, the word ‘refugee’ is the subject
of a well-established and widely accepted legal regime.
For those advocating for the systematic and comprehen-
sive protection of people displaced by disaster, refugee
status is arguably the strongest mechanism through
which individuals in need of protectionwho have crossed
an international border can receive that protection out-
side their own state. On the other hand, recipient-states
commonly perceive the cross-border movement of peo-
ple as a potential security threat. In this way, the concept
of ‘climate refugee’ is argued to be a “calculated ambigu-
ity deployed by certain actors and agencies, especially in
the global North, to mark the boundaries between ‘our
space’ and ‘their space”’ (Gregory, 2009, pp. 369–370, as
cited in Doyle & Chaturvedi, 2011, p. 288). It reinforces
a traditional North–South security paradigm where “the
supposedly rational North tends to be positioned norma-
tively in control in relation to ‘chaotic’ southern states”
(Farbotko, 2017, p. 75). People displaced by climate-
related disaster are constructed as embodying “a dan-
ger for receiving states, not for the displaced themselves”
(Farbotko, 2017, p. 75). Thus, the potential for refugee
status is both an advocacy tool for those concerned with
the rights of people on the move, and a point of resis-
tance for states reluctant to receive them.
3. Non-Refoulement and the 2020 Decision of the UN
Human Rights Committee
The principle of non-refoulement under international
human rights law offers limited protection against return
where an individual has survived the initial disaster
and fled across an international border. It arises in cir-
cumstances where to be returned would give rise to
a threat to life, torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment in contravention of Articles 6 and 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) or Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (UN Human Rights Committee, 2004,
para. 12). The obligation is on the receiving state not
to return that person to their disaster-affected home
state. However, we are yet to see a single successful case
where non-refoulement has been expressly activated on
these grounds.
The January 2020 decision of the UN Human Rights
Committee is the most significant legal decision on
the nexus between non-refoulement and disaster to
date (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020). In it, the
Committee was asked to consider the extent to which
the right to life could activate non-refoulement protec-
tions in the context of slow-onset disaster. In this case
a national of the small island state of Kiribati argued
that in returning him to Kiribati, New Zealand violat-
ed its non-refoulement obligations under international
law because the effects of sea level rise in his home
state violate his right to life. The Committee accept-
ed the claimant’s evidence that sea level rise caused
by climate change posed a threat to the islands. Fresh
water had become scarce and was often contaminated,
the construction of sea walls had been largely ineffec-
tive against storm surges and king tides, and there had
been instances of violence caused by land disputes in
tensions exacerbated by the environmental conditions.
However, the Committee, by majority (16 of 18 mem-
bers), rejected the claim. It found that potable water,
while scarce, was nevertheless sufficiently available; that
the threat of violencewas not sufficiently personal to the
claimant; and that although salt-water inundation of the
soil made it “difficult to grow crops, it was not impos-
sible” (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020, para. 4.6).
Overall, the Committee was not convinced that the claim
demonstrated a level of “extreme precarity” sufficient to
threaten his right to life (UN Human Rights Committee,
2020, para. 9.9). However, it left open the possibility of
protection if, and when, the situation worsens.
Notably, two separate dissenting opinions expressed
the view that New Zealand’s non-refoulement obli-
gations were violated on the evidence before them:
Individual opinion of Committee member Vasilka
Sancin (dissenting), and separate individual opinion of
Committeemember Duncan LakiMuhumuza (dissenting;
UN Human Rights Committee, 2020, Annexes 1–2). The
dispute between theminority and themajority appeared
to be one of degree, that is, at what point of “precarity”
non-refoulement obligations are triggered. In the dissent-
ing opinion of member Muhumuza:
The considerable difficulty in accessing fresh water
because of the environmental conditions, should be
enough to reach the threshold of risk, without being
a complete lack of fresh water….It would indeed be
counterintuitive to the protection of life, to wait for
deaths to be very frequent and considerable; in order
to consider the threshold of risk as met. (UN Human
Rights Committee, 2020, Annex 2, para. 5)
Although the decision was in many respects a restate-
ment of existing principles of international law, what
is important about the Committee’s ruling is that it
offers an authoritative statement of the connection
between the disaster-related impacts of climate change
and the principle of non-refoulement (McAdam, 2020).
As McAdam has observed, the decision also left scope
for the possibility that “a different individual, in another
part of the world, might already have a valid protection
claim” (McAdam, 2020, p. 3). Finally, the dissenting opin-
ions offer some fodder for future debate about whether
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the non-refoulement obligations of a statemight apply at
an earlier point than was recognised by the majority.
4. Internal Displacement and recent Developments in
Legal Protections
Most people displaced by disaster remain within the
state in which the disaster occurred. For internally dis-
placed people (IDPs), refugee law and non-refoulement
are not applicable unless and until they cross an inter-
national border. There is very little binding interna-
tional law which addresses internally displaced peo-
ple specifically. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement (GPID) were the first comprehensive
assessment of protections for IDPs under international
law. The GPID offered guidance on the interpretation
of extant principles of international humanitarian law
and international human rights law in the context of
internal displacement. The only treaty the subject mat-
ter of which is protection for IDPs is the 2009 African
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. For the rest of the
world, there are no binding instruments of internation-
al law on point, although human rights obligations con-
tinue to apply. Recognising this protection gap, and the
exponential growth in the number of IDPs in 2019, the
UN Secretary-General convened a High Level Panel on
Internal Displacement (hereafter the Panel) in December
of that year. Comprised of eight state representatives
advised by a small Expert Group, the Panel’s central
focus is to find long-term solutions to, raise awareness
of, and improve efforts to address, internal displacement.
The Panel is due to submit its final recommendations in
February 2021, one year after its first meeting (UN, 2020;
UN Secretary-General, 2019).
Although disaster is not the exclusive focus of the
Panel’s work, its appointment came on the heels of expo-
nential growth in the number of people internally dis-
placed by disaster (Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre, 2020a) and a growing number of interna-
tional instruments addressing disaster displacement
in the past decade. Language connecting disaster
and displacement was incorporated into the Cancun
Agreement of the Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC,
2011, para. 14(f)), the Sendai Framework (2015, paras. 4,
28(d), 33(h)(j)), the New York Declaration for Refugees
and Migrants (2016, paras. 1, 18, 43, 50) and the sub-
sequent global compact agreements in 2018 (Global
Compact on Refugees, 2018, paras. 8, 9, 12, 53, 63, 79;
Migration Compact, 2018, in particular para. 18(h)–(l)).
As referred to above, global processes were also cre-
ated to address disasters and displacement, includ-
ing the Nansen Initiative (2012–2015) which was suc-
ceeded by the Platform on Disaster Displacement, and
the 2015 Paris Outcome established the Taskforce on
Displacement under the auspices of the UNFCCC (2015,
para. 49). A common elementwithin each of these instru-
ments and processes is recognition that themitigation of
displacement is closely connected to disaster risk reduc-
tion, and grounded in principles of human rights.
Disaster risk reduction as an express component of
international human rights law and international migra-
tion law is a reasonably newdevelopment, but onewhich
has corresponded to the growth of international law in
the context of disaster. Until recently such protections
were largely implicit in human rights law as part of the
accepted principle that states have an obligation not
only to refrain from violating human rights, but also to
take positive steps to protect them (see Budayeva and
Others v. Russian Federation, 2008, para. 128; Öneryildiz
v. Turkey, 2004, para. 71; UN Human Rights Committee,
2004, para. 6). More recently, human rights bodies
have made express the connection between disaster risk
reduction and human rights. In a 2017 Advisory Opinion,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
recognised that, as part of the right to life, states are
under a duty to “prepare a contingency plan” in environ-
mental impact assessments for activities likely to pose
a risk to the environment. The purpose of such contin-
gency plans is, among other things, to “minimize the con-
sequences of disasters” (IACtHR, 2017, paras. 171, 242).
The Advisory Opinion was confined to matters relevant
to the advice for which it was sought. Thus it was a sig-
nificant development when, in 2018, the UN Committee
responsible for interpretation of the ICCPR issued a
revised guidance on the interpretation of the right to
life generally, which included disaster preparedness ele-
ments. It provided that in fulfilling their duty to pro-
tect life, states “should…develop, when necessary, con-
tingency plans and disaster management plans designed
to increase preparedness and address natural and man-
made disasters, which may adversely affect enjoyment
of the right to life” (UN Human Rights Committee, 2018,
para. 26). In this way, the Committee for the first time
expressly read a disaster preparedness element into the
state obligation to protect the right to life.
The 2018 Migration Compact is the first interna-
tional migration agreement negotiated between states
to include a commitment to mitigate the displacement
effects of disaster. Under the heading “natural disas-
ters, the adverse effects of climate change, and envi-
ronmental degradation,” states commit to “minimize the
adverse drivers and structural factors that compel peo-
ple to leave their country of origin” (Migration Compact,
2018, para. 18(h)–(l)). Included among the strategies to
realise that commitment are: to strengthen analysis and
mapping of climate and disaster risk; to develop adapta-
tion, resilience and disaster preparedness strategies; and
to develop approaches to address sudden and slow-onset
disasters which take into account processes such as the
Nansen Initiative’s Protection Agenda and the work of
the Platform on Disaster Displacement. Moreover, states
commit to developing approaches at regional and sub-
regional levels to ensure that people impacted by disas-
ter “have access to humanitarian assistance that meets
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their needswith full respect for their rightswherever they
are” (Migration Compact, 2018, para. 18(k)). Although
the Migration Compact itself is not strictly legally bind-
ing, it is a political commitment which ‘rests on’ interna-
tional law, including core human rights instruments list-
ed in its preamble: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Migration Compact,
2018, Preamble, para. 2).
The past decade has seen several advancements in
protections for people internally displaced by disaster,
resting particularly on human rights norms. A number
of international instruments now recognise the nexus
between disaster and displacement in express terms and
disaster risk reduction has become an explicit compo-
nent of the state obligation to protect life. TheMigration
Compact specifically acknowledges that disaster pre-
paredness, addressing vulnerabilities, and human rights
protection, are key elements in protecting people from
disaster-related displacement. These developments are
not only significant in law, they coincide with a substan-
tial increase in the incidence of disaster displacement
and therefore have the potential for meaningful impact
to the extent that states adapt domestic law and poli-
cy accordingly.
5. Challenges for Upholding International Legal
Protections in the Context of a Changing Climate
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a series of contempo-
rary realities hinder the realisation of protections for
people displaced by disaster. A reversion to isolation-
ist politics in large migrant-receiving states (Anderson-
Nathe & Gharabaghi, 2017), domestic prejudices exac-
erbated by the recent pandemic (Larsson, 2020), and
the perennial difficulties associated with humanitarian
access and the enforcement of international law, are but
a few (Koh, Chayes, Chayes, & Franck, 1997; Silingardi,
2012). There is not scope here to focus on all of these,
important though they are. This section instead consid-
ers the legal impact of a single but critical challenge for
a state’s capacity to ensure effective protection of peo-
ple displaced by disaster in accordance with internation-
al law: climate change.
We know that most disaster-related internal dis-
placements are associated with ocean and rainfall
events such as tropical cyclones and monsoons (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020a, p. 8). Rising
ocean temperatures have made cyclones more intense,
and rising sea levels have intensified storm surges, and
saltwater inundation has caused the salination of pre-
viously arable soil and contaminated fresh water sup-
ply (Pörtner et al., 2019, p. 91). A recent report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indi-
cates that earlier scientific predictions underestimated
the speed with which climate change impacts would be
realised (Pörtner et al., 2019, p. 106). We also know that
the vast majority of people who are displaced by disaster
tend to remain within the same region, thus still proxi-
mate to the same climate phenomena. Yet, the durabil-
ity of cross-border regional solutions can be challenged
where neighbouring states are at risk of the same or sim-
ilar climate-related events. As a result, climate change
leads to not only more numerous instances of displace-
ment but also to the risk of repeated ones (Nansen
Initiative, 2015, para. 75).
That some people are displaced more than once is
not a new finding; it is already well-documented in the
context of other indices of vulnerability and displace-
ment (Zetter & Morrissey, 2014). Migrant populations
are often among the most seriously affected by disaster
or climate-related events (Simperingham, 2017, p. 88).
Refugee camps in Bangladesh and Syria have recently
experienced severe flooding from unusually heavy rain-
fall which rendered encampments unliveable, even life-
threatening (Kelly, 2019; “Monsoon destroys Rohingya
shelters,” 2019). But climate change increases the
instances in which initial and subsequent displacement
is disaster related. Indeed, for residents of small island
states and low-lying coastal areas, inundation caused
by sea level rise can trigger a series of displacements
over time, where each movement is neither durable
nor necessarily distant, but rather only so far as cir-
cumstances permit and the ocean demands (McDonnell,
2019; Rigaud et al., 2018, p. xv). Repeated disaster-
related displacement challenges the effective implemen-
tation of protection obligations because, among other
things, it renders the logistics of providing assistance, as
well as monitoring and compliance, more challenging.
As the preceding sections of this article attest, in the
context of international law, human rights norms govern
or underpin much of the law applicable to people dis-
placed in the context of disaster. Indeed, the principle
of non-refoulement, the Migration Compact, the GPID,
and the Sendai Framework and other relevant instru-
ments are premised, in whole or in part, upon bind-
ing human rights norms. Yet disaster itself compromises
state capacity generally. A question then arises: To what
extent can a state be expected to uphold its interna-
tional legal obligations in the context of disaster? This
is not a new consideration but one worth cautiously
observing in the present context. In general, states may
derogate from human rights obligations only temporar-
ily and in situations of declared public emergency that
threaten the life of the nation to the extent required
by the exigencies of the situation (American Convention
on Human Rights, 1969, Art. 27; European Convention
on Human Rights, 1950, Art. 15; ICCPR, 1966, Art. 4).
Thus, it is prima facie recognised in human rights law
itself that the full observation of some rights might need
to be curtailed to allow an effective disaster response.
At the same time, it is during purported public emer-
gencies that the most egregious human rights abuses
have occurred (Joseph & Castan, 2013, p. 910). Thus, the
boundaries of what is permissible ought to be carefully
and consciously observed.
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Notably, some rights cannot be derogated from at all,
even during a public emergency that threatens the life
of the nation. These include, but are not limited to, the
right to life, and freedom from cruel inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment (American Convention on Human Rights,
1969, Art. 27(2); European Convention on Human Rights,
1950, Art. 15(2); ICCPR, 1966, Art. 4(2)). Accordingly, the
principle of non-refoulement, which is premised upon
these two rights, applies even in the aftermath of dis-
aster. A recent case study is illustrative of the issues
that can arise in practice. Hurricane Dorian made land-
fall in The Bahamas on 1 September 2019. The damage
was catastrophic, with a fifth of the population impact-
ed and over 9,000 homes destroyed. Among the worst
affected were Haitians, and Bahamas-born nationals of
Haitian descent. Historic marginalisation has meant that
Haitians in The Bahamas often live in poverty, without
access to basic services such as running water (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020a, p. 61). Before
the hurricane, and in line with its protection obligations,
The Bahamas had suspended repatriation of irregular
Haitian arrivals in 2019due toongoing civil unrest inHaiti.
It assessed that to return irregular migrants would be a
violation of the principle of non-refoulement. However,
after the hurricane, repatriations of irregular Haitian
arrivals resumed in earnest (International Organization
for Migration, 2019).
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has
reported that Haitians are at greater risk as immigra-
tion authorities have “taken advantage of the disaster”
to enforce immigration policy and deport undocument-
ed Haitians (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre,
2020a, p. 61). According to the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre, The Bahamas authorities have
implied that because Haitian people are not citizens
they “should not…be considered internally displaced
or entitled to support and compensation” (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020a, p. 61). Given
The Bahamas’ earlier determination that the repatriation
of irregular arrivals would violate its non-refoulement
obligations, to resume repatriations immediately after
the hurricane is worthy of scrutiny. If the Haitian nation-
als being repatriated in the aftermath of Hurricane
Dorian would face threats to the right to life or right
to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment if they were returned, then their repatriation
would be unlawful. That is so irrespective of any addi-
tional resource burden this might place on the state of
The Bahamas in the aftermath of the hurricane.
How, then, can a state comply with human rights
obligations in circumstances where the apparatus of the
state, and its capacity to respond, are severely dimin-
ished not only by disaster itself but by repeated and
more intense events? TheDraft Articles on the Protection
of Persons in the Event of Disasters (hereafter Draft
Articles), adopted by the ILC in 2016, offer some guid-
ance. The purpose of the Draft Articles is to “facilitate the
adequate and effective response to disasters and reduc-
tion of the risk of disasters, so as to meet the essen-
tial needs of the persons concerned, with full respect
for their rights” (ILC, 2016, Art. 2). “Persons concerned”
includes people displaced by disaster or likely to be dis-
placed by a future disaster (ILC, 2016, p. 5). Crucially,
the Draft Articles delineate for the first time a state duty
to seek external assistance where the disaster “mani-
festly exceeds its national response capacity” (ILC, 2016,
Art. 11) and the obligation not to arbitrarily withhold con-
sent permitting external assistance (ILC, 2016, Art. 13).
Although the Draft Articles are essentially a draft treaty,
yet to be adopted by states, they offer some indication
of what the current state of customary international law
might be, in line with the role delegated to it by the
UN General Assembly to encourage the codification of
international law (Charter of the United Nations, 1945,
Art. 13; United Nations General Assembly, 1945, Art. 1).
However, its role is also to encourage the progressive
development of international law and there has been
some debate among states within the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly over which elements of the
Draft Articles represent custom and which might be bet-
ter described as progression. The General Assembly is
due to debate the terms of the Draft Articles again this
year (UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 2019).
6. Conclusion
Translating international law into meaningful applica-
tion on the ground is a perennial challenge, and one
only exacerbated in the context of disaster. Many of
the regions most effected by displacement from disas-
ter have limited state capacity to plan and prepare, and
often possess numerous indices of vulnerability such as
hazard exposure, low socio-economic status among the
populace, and poor infrastructure development (Fatemi,
Ardalan, Aguirre, Mansouri, & Mohammadfam, 2017).
The impacts of climate change amplify these. Sea level
rise, drought, increased intensity of storms, storm surges
and their consequent effects such as contamination of
water supplies, and the loss of arable land, lead not only
to more numerous instances of displacement but also
to the risk of repeated displacement of the same peo-
ple. It is undoubtedlymore difficult to uphold and ensure
international legal protection for people who are recur-
rently on the move, and even more so where that dis-
placement occurs within a state or region facing more
than one crisis.
In this context, the Covid-19 pandemic is a sober-
ing case study and a reminder of the importance
of preparedness and disaster risk reduction. The pan-
demic has had serious implications for the realisation
of legal protections owed to individuals displaced by
non-pandemic-related disaster. As was recently experi-
enced in the aftermath of Cyclone Amphan, which hit
the Bay of Bengal in the midst of the pandemic: It is diffi-
cult to respond to a disaster, and in particular to accom-
modate people displaced, while maintaining appropri-
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ate social distancing (Sarkar, 2020). To the extent that
states continue to lag in terms of disaster preparedness,
displaced communities will struggle to receive protec-
tion whether within their own state or in the state to
which they have migrated. In many traditional migrant-
receiving states, borders have closed in response to the
virus to protect local populations from infection while
xenophobic sentiment has escalated and furthered the
‘othering’ ofmigrant communities (Devakumar, Shannon,
Bhopal, & Abubakar, 2020; Larsson, 2020). Thus, while
refugee status and non-refoulement could assist more
people as climate impacts intensify and trigger greater
cross-border displacement from disaster, at the same
time political resistance, on the basis that to do so
would open the proverbial floodgates to new migrants,
may stymie that prospect, despite the legal validity of
non-refoulement arguments.
Within the matrix of international legal instruments
that govern situations in which individuals are displaced
by disaster, human rights forms a common and ground-
ing element. The recent work of the UN Human Rights
Committee and the IACtHR, the evolution of language on
human rights and displacement from Hyogo to Sendai,
the global compact agreements, and more recent UN ini-
tiatives (Guterres, 2020) all evidence this trend. States
are not recused from meeting their human rights obli-
gations even in situations of public emergency and may
be under an obligation to seek external assistance where
disaster exceeds the state’s capacity to respond. Crucially,
the UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that plan-
ning and preparedness to address future disasters form
part of a state’s obligation to uphold the right to life.
As climate change exacerbates the frequency and inten-
sity of disasters, states are under an obligation to be pre-
pared, including for the displacement effects.
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